Archive for the ‘Resources - Energy - Environment’ Category

BP’s Deepwater Horizon – BP Begins “Fishing Operation” – and Open Thread

Saturday, August 21st, 2010

Based on a press release by BP this evening, BP started the "fishing" operation aimed at removing the drill pipe this is within the BOP this morning.

One reason for removing the drill pipe is a practical one, according to a technical talk by BP's Kent Wells on August 19:

Reporter: I was hoping you could explain a little bit more why you need to remove the drill pipe; how it would impede the progress in moving the capping stack and the legacy BOP and putting the new one on.

Kent Wells: Yes. Another good question. So, we could have up to, I think it’s around 3,500 feet of drill pipe hanging below the BOP. And, if we were to – and we believe that the drill pipe’s being held by the BOP. So, if we were to try to pick up the BOP right now, we’d have to lift it 3,500 feet straight up to pull all of the drill pipe out, and then we’d have difficulty handling that, et cetera.

So, we think it’s more prudent for us to go in and try to what we call fish it, actually pull the drill pipe out first and recover all of it, and then go and then take off the capping stack and then recover the BOP. So, I think that’s the procedure that we believe is the most prudent way to go about it, at this point in time.

In the same technical talk, Kent Wells indicated that the fishing operation wouldn't be very easy to watch through the ROV cameras:

We’ll actually be fishing inside the capping stack down into the BOP, so there wouldn’t be any good ROV feed that would indicate that. But, what we will do is we’ll make sure that we keep you informed through briefings or releases, et cetera, about how that process is going, so that you understand it.

Once the drill pipe is removed, the next step will be to remove the blowout preventer (BOP) in an undamaged way, so that it can be used as evidence in determining why it did not function properly at the time of the original blowout. Admiral Allen sent Bob Dudley a letter, giving him until Sunday evening to put together a plan for safely removing the BOP, and ensuring that the BOP salvage operation does not compromise the investigation. According to the letter:

According to BP's recent press release, once BP gets approval, it will proceed with an operation in which it replaces the original BOP with the BOP from the second relief well. In anticipation of a successful operation, BP has unlatched its BOP from the second relief well site.

BP's press release also indicates that BP and the federal science team are also making contingency plans, in case something goes wrong with the fishing operations.

BP’s Deepwater Oil Spill – Bonnie’s Expected Impacts; Industry New Containment Plan – and Open Thread

Saturday, July 24th, 2010

With Tropical Depression Bonnie dissipating, the slow process of getting all of the boats back in place and workers back to work is now beginning. Much of the discussion at Admiral Allen's press conference on Saturday, however, was about the expected impact of the Bonnie. NOAA Administrator Dr. Jane Lubchenco was present to explain the impacts. She indicated she expected a number of positive benefits of the storm:

  • It will spread the surface slick out and thereby lower oil concentrations.
  • It's expected to break tar patches and tar mass into smaller tar balls which means faster weathering and faster natural biodegradation.
  • It will also cause more natural dispersion again lowing the concentration of oil in the water and making it more available to the natural bacteria that are in the water that do this natural biodegradation.
  • Some waves generated by Bonnie may act to flush the beaches and redistribute oil and tar balls that are on the beaches. Some of those tar balls may be dispersed, some may move back out to sea. In some cases, the beaches may look cleaner as a result of this redistribution.

Dr. Lubchenco wouldn't quite go as far as say that she expected the storm to be a net benefit, though. She said it would depend on where you are. Some places might be better, but others might be worse. In some places, oil might be pushed farther inland, although with little storm surge, this would be a relatively smaller problem. The storm wouldn't have any impact on the deep oil mixed with the water.

Admiral Allen mentioned that it had been possible to keep two vessels on the scene, so they were able to be with the ROVs overnight. Thus, they were able to continue monitoring pressure readings. Pressure readings continue to slowly rise (6,891 psi at midnight last night), showing evidence of integrity at the well head.

New Oil Spill Containment System Planned by Chevron, Conoco Phillips, ExxonMobil, and Shell

I thought I would shift gears and show some information about the new oil spill containment system that the four other major oil companies are working on, which you have probably read about in the news.

The information I am quoting and the image are from the Containment System Fact Sheet. Further information is available on a Press Release.

According to the Overview:

This system offers key advantages to the current response equipment in that it will be pre-engineered, constructed, tested and ready for rapid deployment in the deepwater Gulf of Mexico. Its primary objective is to fully contain the oil with no flow to the sea. The system will be flexible and adaptable. It will be responsive to a wide range of potential scenarios, deepwater depths up to 10,000 feet, weather conditions and flow rates exceeding the size and scope of the current spill. Once constructed, the system components will be fully tested to ensure functionality and will be maintained in a state of continuous operational readiness. In the event of a future incident, mobilization to the field will start within days and the system will be fully operational within weeks.

Subsea components:

• A newly designed and fabricated subsea containment assembly will create a permanent connection and seal to prevent oil from escaping into the water.

• The assembly will be equipped with a suite of adapters and connectors to interact with various interface points such as the wellhead, blowout preventer stack, lower marine riser package and casing strings, including any well design and equipment used by the various operators in the Gulf of Mexico.

• The assembly will be designed to prevent hydrate formation and blockage.

• Capture caisson assemblies will also be built for use if required to enclose a damaged connector or leak outside the well casing. Once installed, these assemblies will create a seal with the seabed to prevent seawater from entering the system.

• The oil would be captured by the subsea containment assembly and flow through flexible pipe to a riser assembly. Riser assemblies are made of a seabed foundation, vertical pipe, buoyancy tanks and a flexible pipe specifically configured to connect to the capture vessels.

• The subsea system will be supplied with the necessary hydraulic / electric controls and chemical injection (such as hydrate inhibitors) through an umbilical.

• A manifold will distribute the oil from the subsea containment assembly to multiple riser assemblies if more than one capture vessel is necessary.

• Riser assemblies and umbilical will be designed to quickly disconnect from capture vessels so that all subsea equipment stays in place in the event of a hurricane. An additional system component will be available to inject dispersant into the subsea containment assembly if required.

There are also surface vessels, which I won't describe. The fact sheet indicates that the initial investment is expected to be approximately $1 billion. The new system is targeted for completion within 18 months. ExxonMobil has been designated to lead the engineering, procurement and construction of the system components. The companies behind this endeavor will form a new non-profit organization, the Marine Well Containment Company (MWC), to operate and maintain the system.

BP’s Deepwater Oil Spill – Results as the Testing Begins – and Open Thread 2

Friday, July 16th, 2010

Becasue of the number of comments, this is a second copy of this thread. Prior thread can be found at http://www.theoildrum.com/node/6734.

The picture that everyone has long been waiting to see became available after 3:25 pm (Eastern) yesterday afternoon, when BP closed the choke lines on the 3-ram stack, and oil stopped flowing into the Gulf.

The process started on Wednesday evening, after a delay during which the Admiral gave permission for the process to start, and held the press conference that I reported on yesterday.

It was followed by the Kent Wells' conference, which had been delayed, in which he noted that the relief well had finished a gyro survey to locate its position, and prepared the site for the casing to be set this weekend. Then the drill pipe etc. was pulled back into the casing while the integrity test was run. It was left in the well so that, in case there was any passage created between the two wells during the test (they are only just over four feet apart), then heavy mud could be immediately pumped down the RW to kill the risk of any additional problems. (The drill has 30 ft to go to reach the casing point, but is at the desired 2 degree angle).

One of the changes to the plan from that originally conceived was to add four ROVs that would be stationed around the well to alleviate the fears of those who had become worried by the continuing plethora of stories of a breached well casing. Although many of these stories have been discussed, and their invalidity shown, nevertheless in order to keep everyone happy (particularly those with political prominence), four ROVs were set around the well to watch the seabed and ensure there were no leaks.

This is one example of the results – the seabed is stable, with no oil and gas bubbling up from non-existent leaks. (BOA ROV 2)

Had there been any leakage from the well it would likely have come up around the casing of the well at the bottom. Here is the shot (BOA ROV 1) of the mud-line of the well. (The point where the well breaks through the mud to the sea bed).

As you can see, there is none. (The well casing with the BOP above it are just to the right of the lights of the illuminating ROV.)

The other change that Secretary Chu apparently imposed was that there be a conference every six hours during the test (which is scheduled to run 48 hours).

The initial plan was to close the rams sealing the well (which happened before I wrote the post yesterday) and then to close the kill line (the two ports that produced the vertical jets I showed last evening) and then to slowly (over a few minutes) close the choke, monitoring the pressure, until the flow ceased.

There should also be a little clarity in the discussion at this point. There are two sets of valves and circuits involved in this process. The first of these are the circuits on the original blowout preventer (BOP) . The kill and choke lines attached to those circuits were modified so that oil and gas are fed through them to the vessels on the surface which are either collecting or burning off the fuel. The second set of kill and choke valves are on the new stack that was mounted above the BOP, and it is these new valves that are being opened and closed. When the stack valves are open, the oil flows out into the water, rather than into directed lines, and so they are not the same circuits. At the beginning of the test the BOP valves were closed, so that all the flow went up to the stack where it can flow out through either the drill pipe at the top, the kill lines to the side, or the choke line – which is the curved yellow pipe at the top of the well. The drill pipe flow was first closed, using the central ram in the stack.

As the test began (and as Kent Wells noted in the morning briefing Thursday) that there was a leak.

. . . we noticed a leak on a hub on the choke line. And so when we saw that, that would have precluded us from properly doing the test, we needed to get that fixed. Fortunately, as everything, we always plan so we had a second choke on surface. So we disconnected that choke and hub system. Took it up, brought the other one down, landed it this morning and we’re once again going through the process of positioning ourselves to do the well integrity tests.

There were in fact two trips to the surface before the choke line was fully in place.

The well was then ready to ramp up for the test, and this was the schedule that Kent Wells reported in the afternoon briefing Thursday:

At 10:30 this morning we closed the kill line and since we had already had the middle ram of the capping stack closed that meant the only flow at that point was going out through the choke line and what was also being collected through the Q4000 and the helix producer.

Then between 10:30 and 12:30 we shut down the Q4000, we shut down the helix producer and that meant only flow was going up through the choke line and then at 12:30 we started to close the choke, we would do it a half a turn at a time to just slowly start to close the well in.

And at about 1:15 this afternoon we issued that the integrity test was starting. The official time of the choke being fully closed, which meant the well was fully shut in is approximately 2:25 this afternoon and as of that time there is no flow of oil going into the gulf of Mexico. So obviously this is an encouraging point of time. Remember this is the start of our test.

So the well is currently shut-in, though the results have not been all that had been hoped for. Admiral Allen has already issued a terse comment:

"We're encouraged by this development, but this isn't over. Over the next several hours we will continue to collect data and work with the federal science team to analyze this information and perform additional seismic mapping runs in the hopes of gaining a better understanding on the condition of the well bore and options for temporary shut in of the well during a hurricane. It remains likely that we will return to the containment process using this new stacking cap connected to the risers to attempt to collect up to 80,000 barrels of oil per day until the relief well is completed."

Part of the problem, apparently, is that the well pressure has not reached the 8 - 9,000 psi level that it was hoped it would reach, but instead it is reported to have fallen slightly shy of 7,000 psi. While this is below the expectation, it is higher than the 6,000 psi that Admiral Allen had set as the target below which they would assume a loss in integrity, and restart the flow of oil to the surface vessels.

To try and add a little context to this, at the beginning of the leak, the pressure of the oil and gas in the rock at the bottom of the well was measured at 11,900 psi. When the oil and gas fill the well that fluid column has a certain weight that balances some of the rock pressure, and the difference should be the pressure at the top of the column (which is where the BOP and stack sit). That gives the 8 – 9,000 psi range.

If the well pressure at the BOP is measured, however, at just shy of 7,000 psi then there are two possibilities. The first is that there has been so much flow of fluid out of the well that the driving pressure of the fluid in the rock has fallen by the 1,500 psi or so that brings the pressures down to those seen.

While that is a possibility, it may be unlikely because, at the time that the Top Kill was tried and as the Admiral noted just the other day, the well pressure could not be raised above 6,000 psi as they pumped in mud, even though at one stage they stopped the flow of oil out of the well.

What this could indicate is that there is a possibility of crossflow at the bottom of the well. What this means that the oil and gas that are flowing out of the reservoir into the bottom of the well, are, under the pressure in the well, now flowing into a higher reservoir of rock, now that they can't get out of the well. Depending on where that re-injection flow is, this may, or may not, suggest that the casing has lost integrity. This is a topic that has been covered in the comments at The Oil Drum, where fdoleza has noted:

Exactly. I believe the flow will be coming out of the bottom sand and going into the upper sand. It would not be a leak, but it would tell them why their pressure data ain't a classical surface buildup. And I sure hope they're modeling temperatures and so on, because this is a very interesting case. They don't have downhole gauges, so they'll have to take the way the oil cools down as it sits to get a better idea of the way things are moving down below.

If there are questions whether there is still flow in the formation or from the original formation into surrounding rock, then it is possible that the relief well (RW) is close enough to the original well (WW) that putting a set of very sensitive microphones down the RW might allow some triangulation to estimate where such a flow might be occurring. It might make it easier that the well hasn’t been finally cased yet. But the test has 2 days to run, and will be evaluated every 6 hours. With time some of these questions may be answered as the test continues. (If there is no flow anywhere, after a while all the readings should become quite stable).

Oh, and just as this started to look like a little good news, there is this from the National Hurricane Center:

The windows of opportunity are not likely to remain open long. It is encouraging, however, that there may now be an answer if these do turn into hurricanes.

Deepwater Oil Spill – the BP CEO and Congress – and Open Thread 2

Friday, June 18th, 2010

Because of the large number of comments, this is a second copy of this thread.

There are many people who have questions for Tony Hayward, the CEO of BP. (For those behind the times, they changed their name from British Petroleum some 9 years ago.) Today was the turn of Congress.

But before going to that testimony, the current status for things in the Gulf, as far as oil recovery from the Deepwater Horizon well oil spill is:

Optimization of the dual system, LMRP Cap and the Q4000 Direct Connect, will continue over the next few days.

For the first 12 hours on June 17 (midnight to noon), approximately 8,000 barrels of oil were collected and approximately 4,500 barrels of oil and 25.8 million cubic feet of natural gas were flared.

On June 16, a total of approximately 14,750 barrels of oil were collected and approximately 3,850 barrels of oil and 40 million cubic feet of natural gas were flared.

That means that oil recovery from the well, which is the sum of that collected and that flared is now reaching a level of 25,000 bd. The capacity of the current system is around 28,000 bd, beyond which they will need to wait for the change in vessels, risers and for the new cap now planned for the end of the month. This will mean that the Q4000 will be disconnected, and control of the valves at the BOP also transferred.

Although it is difficult to tell from the ROV feeds, it appeared earlier that the venting ports at the top of the LMRP cap might have been closed, so that BP are now much closer to capturing all the oil and gas leaking from the well. The feed from the Skandi ROV1 for example seems to have more gas in it than previously. Similarly at the time this was written the vertical feed into the DP at the top of the cap can be seen, from the Enterprise ROV2 feed.


ROV view of the LMRP cap June 17th 8:30 pm

There were five questions that Mr. Hayward was warned that he would be asked about, before he appeared before the House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. However while the committee obviously focused on the events at the particular well (Mississippi Canyon 252 – the Macondo well) which had the disastrous failure, they seemed to find it difficult to accept that, prior to the disaster, and with BP drilling hundreds of wells a year, the CEO’s only knowledge of the well had been that he had heard that it was a successful discovery. Congressman Waxman, for example, dwelt on the ignorance of BP top management about the well.

You are the CEO, so we considered the possibility that you may have delegated the oversight responsibility to someone else. We reviewed the e-mails and briefing documents received by Andy Inglis, the chief executive for exploration and production, and Doug Suttles, the chief operating officer for exploration and production and the person now leading BP’s response to the spill.

According to BP, these are the senior officials who were responsible for the Macondo well. But they too were apparently paying no attention. We could find no evidence that either of them received any e-mails or briefings about the Deepwater Horizon rig or the drilling activities at the well.

It was the Subcommittee Chair, Congressman Stupak who outlined the areas of concern that are being investigated:

We have learned that time and again BP officials had warning signs that this was – as one employee put it – “a nightmare well”. They made choices that set safety aside in exchange for cost cutting and time saving decisions. For example

 They disregarded questionable results from pressure tests after cementing in the well.

 BP selected the riskier of two options for their well design. They could have hung a liner from the lower end of the casing already in the well and install a “tieback” on top of the liner, which would have provided additional barriers to a release of hydrocarbons. Instead they lowered a full string of new casing, which took less time and cost less, but did not provide the same protection against escaping hydrocarbons.

 BP was warned by their cement contractor Halliburton that the well could have a “SEVERE gas flow problem” if BP lowered the final string of casing with only six centralizers instead of the 21 Halliburton recommended. BP rejected Halliburton’s advice to use additional centralizers and in an e-mail on April 16, a BP official involved in the decision explained: “it will take 10 hours to install them. ... I do not like this.”

 BP chose not to fully circulate the mud in the well from the bottom to the top, which was an industry recommended best practice that would have allowed them to test for gas in the mud.

 BP chose not to use a casing hanger lockdown sleeve, which would have provided extra protection against a blowout from below.

In his written response, Mr. Hayward first addressed the processes that BP are going through to address the current problems (cutting off the oil flow to the Gulf, cleaning it up and compensating those who have been damaged and economically impacted). He pointed to seven areas in which BP have focused their inquiries into the incident.

The investigation is focused on the following seven mechanisms:

1. The cement that seals the reservoir from the well;

2. The casing system, which seals the wellbore;

3. The pressure tests to confirm the well is sealed;

4. The execution of procedures to detect and control hydrocarbons in the well, including the use of the blowout preventer (BOP) and the maintenance of that BOP;

5. The BOP Emergency Disconnect System, which can be activated by pushing a button at multiple locations on the rig;

6. The automatic closure of the BOP after its connection is lost with the rig; and;

7. Features in the BOP to allow ROVs to close the BOP and thereby seal the well at the seabed after a blowout.

The video of the testimony is available from the Subcommittee website.

In his opening questions, Congressman Waxman noted that the BP decision to use a single production casing was rebutted by the heads of the other large Oil Companies who had earlier testified before Congress, the reason being that it provided “”an unrestricted pathway for gas to travel up the well through the annular space that surrounded the casing, and of course, it blew out the seal.” Mr. Hayward pointed out that this was the original design for the well, and that it had been approved by the MMS. There was then a debate as to whether a long string, or a 7-inch liner would be most appropriate. The decision to use the long string was based in part on the long term integrity of the well.

Congressman Waxman pointed to a BP memo which included that the use of the long casing consequence would include that “it is unlikely to be a successful cement job, and that it would provide an open annulus to the wellhead.” In contrast the use of the 7-inch liner would largely obviate these risks.

When Mr Hayward tried to answer that, the Congressman cut him off and accused him of stonewalling, refusing to accept that the decision was made based on an engineering judgment – which was the point that the CEO was trying to make. Mr Hayward tried to make the point that the long casing was not an unusual design in the Gulf of Mexico wells, to which the Congressman responded with Halliburton testimony that it was only used in 2 – 10% of the wells, and when Mr Hayward said that he would not personally judge which decision was correct, which the Congressman found unacceptable.

It was that sort of a day for the BP CEO and the full video of the investigative hearing can be downloaded, as I noted.

As the above exchange illustrated, there was not a lot of useful new information that came from the afternoon (though I must admit I had other things to do and did not watch most of it).

Deepwater Oil Spill – A Longer Term Problem, Personnel – and Open Thread 2

Saturday, June 12th, 2010

Because of the number of comments, this is a copy of this post, with a new comment thread.

The recent take-up of oil through the cap and the LMRP to the Drillship Enterprise was at a daily rate of 15,400 bd.

For the last 12 hours on June 11 (noon to midnight), approximately 7,835 barrels of oil were collected and 15.7 million cubic feet of natural gas were flared.

• On June 11, a total of approximately 15,550 barrels of oil were collected and 31.2 million cubic feet of natural gas were flared.

• Total oil collected since the LMRP Cap containment system was implemented is approximately 104,300 barrels.

• Operations were stable..

The Loch Rannoch is on its way, as, possibly, is the Toisa Pisces.

This latter is a Well Testing Service Vessel (WTSV) Dynamic Positioning ship, which has systems for the reception and processing of fluids from well completion, stimulation and repair. For those interested in well flow rates, that measuring capability is among its capabilities.

• Reception of the products from the well via flexible hoses connecting the well to the production system installed on the ship.

• Process and separate water, wasted and un-wasted chemicals, gas, crude oil and solids. The water will be stored in the WTSV’s tanks and later re-injected into industrial waste well or offloaded to a processing facility onshore.

• The crude and gas will be measured in quantity and quality. The combination may be returned to the export line, or if this last is not available, the gas will be flared and the crude stored in the WTSV’s tanks to later be exported to an onshore or an offshore offloading terminal.

• The solids are stored in containers to be disposed to shore.

• Crude ranges are from low to high (12 to 43 °) API. Pressures up to 10,000 psi at the well head.

It has been suggested that it might arrive on site on the 19th June. The Loch Rannoch should arrive a few days earlier, releasing the Drillship Enterprise, which, I suspect, has other things that it might now be doing.

The Toisa Pisces was formerly a cable-laying vessel, and is not a Floating Production, Storage and Offloading unit (FPSO).


Toisa Pisces

My main topic for this post, however, is not the possible change is the fleet over the well, but rather some thoughts on how to avoid this happening again. There were likely a cascade of several errors, each of which alone would not have led to the disaster, but cumulatively they did. So how do we stop it happening again?

In some ways the problem is similar to that the Mining Industry faces after more than twice the number of deaths (29) at the Upper Big Branch Mine in West Virginia in April. In both cases, there were safety concerns reflected in the numbers of citations that the companies had received relative to other companies. So how does one install a different attitude in those who work to produce the fuel that we all need? To a degree, it has to be done through the imposition of regulations that enforce the concept of safety in daily working life. Included in those regulations should be the appropriate recommended practices for carrying out different tasks in the operation.

But even with those regulations in place, they are only as good as the enforcement of them. If my memory serves, you could not become an Inspector of Mines in Britain during the National Coal Board years, unless you had a First Class Certificate of Competency (which is the examination that allows you to manage a mine). The standards of education and training for inspectors must be high, and they need to require a reputable image.

The problems, in part, for both industries, are that the fossil industry historically has been cyclic in nature. Often driven by the price of oil, when that price is high, there are lots of jobs, and both coal and oil boom. The price falls, times get tight, and lots of folk get laid off. It has happened more than once in my career, as we have students go from having many job offers, to students coming back for graduate degrees because there was no work in the industry. The employees that are laid off go find work in other, less cyclic industries.

And so when the next boom comes around, they are no longer available. Furthermore, the teaching departments at the Universities have closed. It is as a result of this boom and bust cycle that there is a dearth of middle management in many companies that work in the fossil fuel business. For many years, they were not hiring, and the folk that they now need as long-time trained and experienced individuals do not exist in large numbers.

The number of both mining and petroleum engineering schools have fallen, and student enrollments, until the recent rise in the price of oil (the $140 one) were bringing other departments closer to that action. At one time, for example, Leeds University in the UK had one of the largest mining departments. At that time, it was housed in a building that was funded by those in the Industry in 1928. That building is now occupied by the Art Department and somewhere – not quite sure where (this from the alumni office and the secretary in the building that houses the remaining odd faculty member) – there is still someone that teaches the odd course (he was out). There is only one other Mining School in the UK, and it studies hard rock mining at Exeter (used to be Cambourne School of Mines).

The Old Mining Building at Leeds


The commemorative plaque

It is hard to criticize University leaders, who must look to where the students are, and which faculty hire will bring the best return to the University. In recent years that has not been within the ability of the fossil fuel departments, and so they are closing – though the demand for their product is now rising again.

It is one of those interesting items to note that the latest reviews of world oil supply are beginning to suggest, increasingly, that the world is approaching if not past the point of peak global oil production. That will require more mining and petroleum engineers, though at places like Leeds (my alma mater), they will likely only be able to produce the modern version of Thomas Hair, to record the modern version of his “Art of Mining,” rather than the subjects of that art.

So what does all this have to do with regulation and responsibility? Well, it is very difficult to maintain high quality folk in industries that go through severe manpower cycles. When regulations are severely enforced under one administration and then almost neglected in another, either because the industry is in disfavor, or the apple of the administration’s eye, it is hard to keep the regulatory inspectorate that is a vital part of running a safe industry. The regulations should be fair, be strict, and must be enforced by individuals that have been properly trained to a high level of understanding as to both the technology that they are reviewing and the consequences of error.

Historical evidence is clear that Universities cannot be left alone to provide that education, and supply those individuals. The National Mine Health and Safety Academy at Beckley is a start in the right direction for the mining industry, but there are other changes that must be made, in the investment in research into new technology, in the general attitude to those who work to provide the fuels that we need (and will continue to do so).

Treating the industries and those who work in them as pariahs is not the way to solve this problem.

Oh, and not to get anyone excited, but for the first time in the recent past there is some earthquake activity under the Myrdalsjokull glacier in Iceland, the home of the Katla volcano. The map shows the age of recent earthquakes. Eyjafjallajokull is the site of the currently active volcano.

The BP Deepwater Oil Spill – the Dispersant Meeting Report – and Open Thread 2

Friday, June 11th, 2010

Because of the large number of comments, this is a new thread.

Concerns about the use of dispersant by the Rapid Response Teams (RRT) working on the Deepwater Horizon spill led to the ”Deepwater Horizon Dispersant Use Meeting” that was held on May 26 -27. A report of that meeting is now available (h/t NatResDr). After a brief review of the current status at the well, with inclinometer readings going on, nuts apparently removed, and the apparent tear of one of the seals in the cap, we’ll get back to that report. First the status:

For the first 12 hours on June 10th (midnight to noon), approximately 7,630 barrels of oil were collected and 15.3 million cubic feet of natural gas were flared.

On June 9th, a total of approximately 15,800 barrels of oil were collected and 31 million cubic feet of natural gas were flared.

And here is the apparent seal that has torn, and slipped out of the cap.


View from the Skandi ROV 2 at 10 pm 10th June 2010.

And so on to what the report says.

The panel included experts from a variety of universities and agencies. To justify the use of dispersants, the report provides a background.

To prevent landfall of the oil, mechanical recovery techniques were used, including skimming and booming, as well as in situ burning. However, when poor weather conditions limited the effectiveness and suitability of mechanical recovery and burning, dispersants were applied to disperse surface oil and prevent landfall. In early May, responders began injecting dispersants at the source of the release in order to prevent oil from reaching the surface. These techniques have largely been successful, and have reduced the amount of oil reaching the nearshore.

The meeting was divided into four breakout groups that addressed

(1) Efficacy and effectiveness of surface and deep ocean use of dispersants;

(2) Physical transport and chemical behavior of dispersants and dispersed oil;

(3) Exposure pathways and biological effects resulting from deep ocean application of dispersants; and

(4) Exposure pathways and biological effects resulting from surface application of dispersants.

What follows are direct quotes from the report.

As background they were also told that:

1. Surface dispersant operations have only been conducted in pre-approved zones (> 3 miles offshore, >10 m water depth).

2. Most dispersants have been applied 20-50 miles offshore where the water is much greater than 100 ft deep;

3. The footprint of surface dispersant application is relatively small;

4. The body of water in which the dispersants are applied is constantly changing; and

5. This meeting focused on oil effects and dispersants in general.

Group One (Effectiveness of dispersants)

They stated that the current state of knowledge was:

 Oil emulsion (> 15 – 20% water) is non-dispersible
 Plume is between 1100 – 1300 m deep moving SW direction
 DWH oil high in alkanes, and has a PAH composition similar to South Louisiana reference crude
 Lighter PAHs (< C15) are likely volatilizing
 Viscosity of emulsified oil is between 5500-8500 centistoke
 Emulsion may be destabilizing (50-60%)
 Primary detection method, C3 (fluorometer), only gives relative trends – does not accurately measure concentration of total oil or degree of dispersion

Their conclusions included the following.

For surface applications

1. Surface application of dispersants has been demonstrated to be effective for the DWH incident and should continue to be used.

2. The use of chemical dispersants is needed to augment other response options because of a combination of factors for the DWH incident (i.e., continuous, large volume release).

3. Winds and currents may move any oil on the surface toward sensitive wetlands.

4. Limitations of mechanical containment and recovery, as well as in situ burning.

5. Weathered DWH oil may be dispersible. Further lab and field studies are needed to assess the efficacy and efficiency and optimal dispersant application (e.g., multiple dispersant applications).

6. Spotter airplanes are essential for good slick targeting for large scale aerial applications (e.g., C-130), so their use should be continued.

7. In order to most effectively use the assets available, the appropriate vessels or aircraft should be selected based on the size and location of the slick and condition of oil.

Dispersing the oil reduces surface slicks and shoreline oiling. The use of chemical dispersants enhances the natural dispersion process (e.g., the smaller droplet size enhances potential biodegradation). Dispersing the oil also reduces the amount of waste generated from mechanical containment and recovery, as well as shoreline cleanup.

For underwater applications

1. The subsurface dispersant dosage should be optimized to achieve a Dispersant to Oil Ratio (DOR) of 1:50. Because conditions are ideal (i.e., fresh, un- weathered oil) a lower ratio can be used, reducing the amount of dispersant required. The volume injected should be based on the minimum oil flowrate, however an accurate volumetric oil flowrate is required to ensure that the DOR is optimized.

2. If we assume a 15,000 bbls/day oil rate and a 1:50 DOR, then actual dispersant flowrate is roughly similar to the current application rate of 9 GPM.

3. To further optimize dispersant efficacy, the contact time between dispersant and oil should be maximized. Longer contact time ensures better mixing of oil and dispersant prior to being released into the water, and should result in better droplet formation.

4. Contact time can be increased by shifting the position of the application wand deeper into the riser, optimizing nozzle design on the application wand to increase fluid sheer, and increasing the temperature of the dispersant to lower viscosity.

5. Effectiveness should be validated by allowing for a short period of no dispersant application followed by a short time of dispersant usage to look for visual improvements in subsurface plume.

Dispersants are never 100% effective. The flow rate of oil out of the damaged riser is not constant, and significant amounts of methane gas are being released. Because the effective DOR is a function of oil flow rate, changes in the oil flow rate may significantly impact the actual DOR. If the DOR is too low, dispersion may not be maximized, while if it is too high, dispersant will be unnecessarily added to the environment. Assumptions are based on knowledge at standard temperatures and pressures (STP), while conditions at the riser are significantly different.

Group members suggested that the oil escaping the damaged riser may be in excess of 100°C, and it is unclear what effect this has on the dispersant, or the efficacy or effectiveness of droplet formation. These conditions may drastically alter fluid behavior. Finally, there is an opportunity cost of changes to application wand position and development and deployment of a new nozzle. When optimized, subsurface dispersant application may reduce or eliminate the need for surface dispersant application, and will reduce surfacing and resurfacing of oil.

Group 2 (Transport and behavior of dispersed oil)

The current state of knowledge is:

 Surface models are effective and continuously improving
 SMART protocols are improving
 Increase of sampling at depth
 Well researched region (oceanographic and ecological studies)
 Well established baseline data
 Airborne application protocols are established

Their conclusions included the following:

1. Create an on-scene environmental review committee to advise SSCs that will be responsible for providing immediate operational and scientific advice, and aid in dispersant decisions.

2. Clearly define geographic area/water volume of concern.

3. Establishment of a more comprehensive sampling and monitoring program to understand transport of oil on the surface and potential for long-term increases to TPH, TPAH, oxygen demand, or lowering of DO with continued dispersant application. This could be done by implementing off-shore water (first 10 m) monitoring stations (e.g., fixed stationary positions such as other drill rigs).

Continued dispersant use trades shoreline impacts for water column impacts. This increases the uncertainty of the fate of the oil, and potentially increases the oil sedimentation rate on the bottom.

Continued dispersant use reduces the threat distance, protects shorelines, likely increases the biodegradation rate of the oil, inhibits formation of emulsions, reduces waste management, and potentially reduces buildup of VOCs in the air.

Group 3 (Biological Effects of Dispersants)

The current state of knowledge is:

 Minerals Management Services, Gulf of Mexico deep water studies/reports:

 Natural hydrocarbon seepage in the Gulf of Mexico approximately 40 million gallons per year
 Some knowledge and past studies on deep water species in the Gulf of Mexico
 Preliminary modeling
 Preliminary monitoring data (Fluorometry data, Particle size analysis, Temperature, Salinity, D.O., Hydrocarbon, Acute toxicity, Acoustic data, sonar, Genomics)

Their conclusions included the following:

1. Dispersant risk assessment should consider volume of DWH incident relative to natural seepage

2. There is a net benefit to continued subsurface dispersant use and application should continue, these include:

 Surface water column and beach impacts vs. vertical water column impacts  Observed reduction in volatile organics at surface
 Enhances the interaction between oil and suspended particulate material
 Accelerated microbial degradation through increased bioavailability
 Rapid recovery of downward sulfate diffusion and upward methane diffusion related to shallow sediment geochemistry
 Based on current knowledge, subsurface dispersant use confines the aerial extent of impact
 Current impact zone is less than 50 km radius
 Reduction in emulsified oil at the surface
 Reduction of phototoxic impacts

Group 4 (Biological Effects of Dispersant on surface water species)

The current state of knowledge is:

 The oil is being dispersed in the top ten meters of the water column from surface dispersant application (fluorescence methods)

Their recommendations included:

1. Surface application of dispersants is acceptable. Transferring the risk from the surface to the top 10 m is the lesser of the many evils.

2. Additional monitoring is required to better model where dispersed oil is going. Long term (monthly) monitoring is required at a minimum, and should be conducted in a grid formation inshore to open ocean. Passive samplers (i.e., SPME) should be used in selected areas, while a active water sampling program should be implemented to measure dispersant and dispersed oil, dissolved oxygen, and standard CTD + chlorophyll concentrations, as well as selected bioassays.

The report has 26 references, some of which are web accessible, and several appendices, listing the agenda, those present, and those in each group.

If you have further questions the report is available.

BP’s Deepwater Oil Spill – Closing the Relief Ports – and Open Thread 2

Monday, June 7th, 2010
The rate of oil recovery from the Deepwater well in the Gulf of Mexico has increased from the 6,000 bd recovered on Friday, to some 10,000 bd which was recovered on Saturday.
On June 5, a total of 10,500 barrels of oil was collected and 22 million standard cubic feet of natural gas was flared.
The closing of one of the ports on the cap is now reported to have increased flow by 600 bd.
On June 6, a total of 11,100 barrels of oil was collected and 22 million cubic feet of natural gas was flared. Optimization continues and improvement in oil collection is expected over the next few days.
If all were carrying the same flow (and if of the same size and driving pressure this is a reasonable assumption) then the flow will rise to just over 13,000 bd when all the ports are closed, and there will still be leakage under the cap to be reduced. Given that the Enterprise can only handle 15,000 bd at most, this is one of the reasons why the ports remain open and that the system to draw off additional oil through the choke and kill lines is being accelerated. (Note: See also BP struggling to process cap-collected mix of oil, seawater, highlighted in Drumbeat.) This is the current flow (note the white spot in the cloud which is the triangular shape at the bottom of the cap).

Flow at 10 am Sunday
And this was the picture that I posted from the same ROV at the time that the cap was installed
From Skandi ROV 2 10:55 pm 4th June
The triangular elements at the bottom of the cap are more evident. Now the ROV may have moved, but the depth of the cloud beyond the cap is roughly the same, suggesting the same pressure driving it, and if the gap is the same size, then the volume leaving through the base of the cap may well be the same. The 4,000 bd increase in flow has thus, likely come from the closing of one or more of the relief ports that allowed oil to escape from the top of the cap.
BP illustration of the cap, showing the relief ports with valves
This cap is likely to stay in place for a couple of weeks, until BP can fabricate and install the next step, which will be to reverse the flow of fluid through the choke and kill lines, so that some of the flow can be directed up to the Q4000. This will both help with managing the flow, and also give an alternate path for oil to be recovered, when this first cap is removed. Update: I had assumed that they had closed most of the ports on the cap to achieve the 10,500 barrels per day flow, but it turns out that so far they have only closed one, and in relation to the numbers at the top of the post, I am not sure when that was done.

So Foul and Fair a Day

Friday, April 23rd, 2010


(As you may guess, this was written a few days ago, but it is still a topic very much on our minds.-Gail)

With the eye of the global media now firmly trained on Iceland, this is a timely reminder of the power our restless planet has to disrupt our daily lives. With air traffic still grounded across much of northern europe, it is truly inconvenient to be a tourist stranded abroad, or to have cancelled a holiday or business trip. But in the grander scheme how serious is this really? European politicians are now awakening to the possibility of this inconvenience dragging on for days or even weeks and are now describing this inconvenience as a crisis. Now no one knows how this eruption will develop. But historical records describe how previous eruptions on Iceland had truly catastrophic impact on Scotland's climate and on the welfare of its people during the tenth to eighteenth centuries.

Below the fold are three excerpts from Professor Alastair Dawson's excellent book, So Foul and Fair a Day that gives an account of the impact of earlier Icelandic eruptions.

page 95

The Eldgja Fires

Some of the most stupendous volcanic eruptions in Iceland took place some time between 934 and 940. The eruptions happened in the district of Eldgja in southern Iceland and nearly 220 million tonnes of sulphate aerosols were injected into the northern hemisphere atmosphere, which combined with water vapor to produce around 450 million tonnes of dilute sulphuric acid that was dispersed worldwide into the troposphere.

The Eldgja volcanic vents stretch along a 75 km length of southern Iceland between Mt Katla and the Vatnajokull ice cap. The early settlers of Iceland must have been amazed by what was happening. Hundreds of square kilometers were covered by lava flows associated with 15 separate eruptions taking place over a 6-year period. Some of the columns of ash are thought to have been in the order of 14 km high. The sagas tell of the destruction of farmland, the abandonment of land. Some families are even described in the sagas as having attempted to rake the cover of volcanic ash from fields. No one knows for sure what the effects were on the weather of northern Europe. Some information can be gained from a similar, though less extensive, eruption of Laki in Iceland during 1783-84. It is well known, for example, that the years following this eruption were associated with the lowering of air temperatures across Northern Europe, the occurrence of dry sulphurous fogs and damage to crops and vegetation. From what we know, the Eldgja eruptions were twice as big as those of Laki. Thus we may expect that the effects on society were at least as severe as those associated with the Laki eruptions, which took place throughout the summer of 1783. Although hardly any historical accounts exist for this period, there are descriptions of drought in Ireland at this time, when the mountains of Connaught were burnt with celestial fire, and the lakes and rivers dried up. There is also an account for 941 of a great frost across Ireland and the freezing of rivers and lakes, but no information is available for Scotland.

page 122

Living in a Freezer

After another cold winter in 1689 to 1690 we enter the 1690s, associated by many with the lowest air temperatures throughout the period 1350-1700. Across northern Europe it was once again a time of dislocated society, population decline and abandonment of farmland. Scotland's climate was already in shock from freezing winter temperatures and wet summers when a series of volcanic eruptions took place. Mt Hekla, in Iceland erupted in 1693, depositing ash across much of Iceland and as far afield as Scotland and Norway. It is also well known that a major southward extension of sea ice took place at this time across the Northern North Atlantic. Whenever this happened, the tracks of storms were displaced further south than normal, leading to bitter winter winds and exceptionally high rainfall across Scotland.

The year 1694 was particularly disastrous, since it was the first of seven years of famine across Scotland known as "King Williams Dear Years". The famine took place prior to widespread potato cultivation in Scotland and hence there was a great dependence on grain. The famine is said to have begun with a cold east wind and sulphurous fog (from the Iceland volcanic eruptions) over the whole country. Hugh Miller from Cromarty, a self taught geologist and natural historian, one of Scotland's great figures from the nineteenth century, tells us in the only known written account of this remarkable event:

One night in the month of August 1694, a cold east wind, accompanied by a dense sulphurous fog, passed over the country, and half filled corn was struck with mildew. It shrank and whitened in the sun, till the fields seemed as if sprinkled with flour, and where the fog had remained longest - for in some places it stood up like a chain of hills during the greater part of the night - the more disastrous were its effects. From the unfortunate year till 1701, the land seemed as if struck with barrenness, and such was the change on the climate, that the seasons of summer and winter were cold and gloomy in nearly the same degree. The wanted heat of the sun was withholden, the very cattle became stunted and meagre. November and December, and in some places January and February, became the months of harvest, and labouring people contracted diseases which terminated in death when employed in cutting down the corn among ice and snow.

page 143

1783 - a disaster across northern Europe

Then things deteriorated even further. In June a major volcanic eruption started in the Laki area of Iceland. The eruptions became more extensive after late July 1783 and continued until January 1784. The effect on the weather of northern europe was immediate. Across Scotland, clear summer skies were soon replaced by a haze of dust and a sulphurous fog which obscured the sun for 3 weeks. In her diary from Kemnay, Aberdeenshire, Janet Burnett, unaware of the volcanic eruption, described how the leaves on the plants in her garden and the crops in the fields were withering yellow. In fact, the year became known in Scotland as "the year of the yellow snow".

The magnitude of the Laki eruption can be gauged by its catastrophic effects in Iceland. approximately 53% of Iceland's cattle, 77% of the ponies and 82% of the sheep died, together with 20% of the island's population. The Icelanders seemed to be facing complete extinction. A committee was appointed in Copenhagen to devise means of relief. There was even a plan considered to evacuate the island and remove the entire population to Denmark.

I am a geologist living in Aberdeen Scotland. So far the most noticeable impact is silence, with the busy airport closed, there has been no jet or helicopter traffic since Thursday. I am amazed by the amount of background noise caused by air traffic that we have become accustomed to - the silence is deafening. We had a light sprinkling of ash on cars on Thursday night and the occasional whiff of hydrogen sulphide. At some point, grounded helicopter traffic will begin to impact North Sea oil operations.

Iceland is one of the most active volcanic regions on Earth, a hot spot sitting on the Mid Atlantic Ridge. The fact that it has been relatively quiet for years has perhaps led the public into a false sense of security. The volcanos on Iceland, including Eyjafjallajökull and its bigger neighbor Katla, have a different eruption pattern to volcanic arc / cordilleran type volcanos (e.g. Krakatoa and Mount St Helens) which tend to have spectacular but short lived explosive eruptions. Hot spot, oceanic volcanos tend to be less spectacular but erupt for prolonged periods of months to years.

While no one knows how the Eyjafjallajökull eruption will develop, Europeans should not be surprised if the disruption goes on for several months and that the impact could become much more serious than disrupted air travel. Large eruptions in the past have made the climate cold and wet with detrimental impact upon harvests and livestock. So far this eruption is not large by historic standards and it may die down and stop. In the past, however, when Eyjafjallajökull has erupted it has woken its larger neighbour Katla. I suspect this story will be in the news for a good while yet.

-------------------------

Note added 21 April:

With much of UK airspace opened on 20th April, helicopter flights to North Sea oil and gas installations resumed Tuesday. However, the local press reports wednesday that helicopter flights were suspended again on Tuesday evening on reports that two helicopters had picked up ash contamination.

As noted by Heading Out in this report, the distribution of ash is uneven and the potential for damage to aircraft may be quite unpredictable. With south westerlies due to take charge of the wether before the weekend it seems likely that Europe will get some respite while the ash cloud is diverted towards eastern Canada.

For so long as Eyjafjallajokull keeps erupting it seems likely that we can expect sporadic disruption to air travel in Europe and much worse if Katla joins in.

What is the Minimum EROI that a Sustainable Society Must Have? Part 3: Calculating the minimum EROI to support the U.S. transportation system

Tuesday, April 6th, 2010

The following multi-part series is taken from a paper we published last year in the free, on-line journal Energies. You may access the entire PDF here. All references can be found in the pdf. Part 1 can be found here. Part 2 can be found here.

In this final installment of the Minimum EROI series we calculate the minimum EROI required from our energy sources to support the current transportation infrastructure of the U.S.

5. Toward a more Comprehensive EROI: A first Estimate of the Downstream Costs associated with Refining, Transporting and Using Oil in the U.S.

If we extend the energy cost of obtaining a fuel from the wellhead towards the final consumer the energy delivered goes down and the energy cost of getting it to that point goes up, both reducing the EROI. This begins the analysis of what might be the minimum EROI required in society. We do this by taking the standard EROI (i.e. EROImm; about 10:1) for oil and then include in the denominator the energy requirements to get fuel to the point of use (i.e. EROIpou) and the energy required to use it, generating an EROIext, i.e. extended EROI. In this analysis we assume the energy costs are paid for in oil.

5.1. Calculating EROI at the point of use

Refinery losses and costs: Oil refineries use roughly 10 percent of the energy in fuel to refine it to the form that we use [28]. In addition about 17 percent of the material in a barrel of crude oil ends up as other petroleum products, not fuel [1]. So for every 100 barrels coming into a refinery only about 73 barrels leaves as usable fuel. Natural gas does not need such extensive refining although an unknown amount needs to be used to separate the gas into its various components and a great deal, perhaps as much as 25 percent, is lost through pipeline leaks and to maintain pipeline pressure. Coal is usually burned to make electricity at an average efficiency of 35 - 40 percent. However the product, electricity, has at least a factor of three higher quality so that we do not count as costs the inefficiency of that process. What this means, however, is that oil resources that have an EROI of 1.1 MJ returned per MJ invested at the wellhead cannot provide energy profits for a society because at least 1.27 MJ of crude oil is required to deliver that one MJ to society as a fuel.

Transportation costs: Oil weighs roughly 0.136 tons per barrel. Transportation by truck uses about 3400 BTU/ton-mile or 3.58 MJ per ton-mile [29]. Transportation by fuel pipeline requires 500 BTU/ton-mile or 0.52 MJ per ton-mile. We assume that the average distance that oil moves from port or oil field to market is about 600 miles. Thus a barrel of oil, with about 6.2 GJ of contained chemical energy, requires on average about 600 miles of travel x 0.136 tons per barrel x 3.58 MJ per ton-mile = 292 MJ per barrel spent on transport, or about 5% of the total energy content of a barrel of oil to move it to where it is used (Table 1). If the oil is moved by pipeline (the more usual case), this percentage becomes about 1%. We assume that coal moves an average of 1500 miles, mostly by train at roughly 1720 BTU per ton mile or about 1.81 MJ per ton-mile [29], so that the energy cost to move a ton of bituminous coal with about 32 GJ/Ton to its average destination is 1500 miles x 1.81 MJ per ton-mile = 2715 MJ per ton, or 2.715 GJ per ton of coal, which is about 8 percent of it’s energy content (Table 1). Line losses, if shipped as electricity, are roughly similar. So adding between 1 and 8 percent of the energy value of fuels for delivery costs does not seem unreasonable. We assume that these costs would decrease all EROIs by a conservative 5 percent (or 3 percent of crude oil in the ground) to get it to the user, in other words the fuel must have an EROI of at least 1.05: 1 to account for delivery of that fuel.

Thus we find that our EROIpou is about 40 percent (17 percent non fuel loss, plus 10 percent to run the refinery, plus 10 percent extraction, plus about 3 percent transportation loss) less than the EROImm indicating that at least for oil one needs an EROI at the mine mouth of roughly 1.4 to get that energy to the point of final use.



5.2. Extended EROI: Calculating EROI at the point of use for oil correcting for the energy required for creating and maintaining infrastructure

We must remember that usually what we want is energy services, not energy itself, which usually has little intrinsic economic utility, e.g. for most oil we want kilometers driven, not just the fuel that does that. That means that we need to count in our equation not just the “upstream” energy cost of finding and producing the fuels themselves but all of the “downstream” energy required to deliver the service (in this case transportation), i.e. 1) building and maintaining vehicles, 2) making and maintaining the roads used, 3) incorporating the depreciation of vehicles, 4) incorporating the cost of insurance, 5) etc. All of these things are as necessary to drive that mile as the gasoline itself, at least in modern society. For the same reason businesses pay some 45 or 50 cents per mile when a personal car is used for business, not just the 10 cents or so per mile that the gasoline costs. So in some sense the dollar required for delivering the service (a mile driven) is some 4 to 5 times the direct fuel costs, and this does not include the taxes used to maintain most of the roads and bridges. Now many of these costs, especially insurance, use less energy per dollar spent than fuel itself and also less than that for constructing or repairing automobiles or roads, although this is certainly not the case with the money used to deliver the fuel itself used in these operations.

On the other hand the energy intensity of one dollar’s worth of fuel is some 8 times greater than that for one dollar’s worth of infrastructural costs. Table 2 gives our estimates of the energy cost of creating and maintaining the entire infrastructure necessary to use all of the transportation fuel consumed in the US. The energy intensities are rough estimates of the energy used to undertake any economic activity derived from the national mean ratio of GDP to energy (about 8.7 MJ/dollar), the Carnegie-Mellon energy calculator web site and from Robert Herendeen (personal communication). Specifically Herendeen estimates for 2005 that heavy construction uses about 14 MJ per dollar. In the 1970s insurance and other financial services had about half (7) the energy intensities as heavy industry [29].

Our calculation, then, of adding in the energy costs of getting the oil in the ground to the consumer in a usable from (40 percent) plus the pro-rated energy cost of the infrastructure necessary to use the fuel (24 percent) is 64 percent of the initial oil in the ground (Table 3). Thus the energy necessary to provide the services of 1 unit of crude oil (i.e. at the gas station) is roughly 3 units of crude oil, and probably similar proportions for other types of fuels. This cuts our 10:1 EROImm to about 3:1 for a gallon at final use, since about two thirds of the energy extracted is necessary to do the other things required to get the service from burning that one gallon. It also means that we need a minimum EROI of 3:1 at the well head to deliver one unit from that oil to final demand.

Future research might further “extend” our “EROIext” by including the energy of all of the people and economic activity included directly and indirectly to deliver the energy. Since, as we have indicated, roughly 10 percent of the economy is associated with getting energy (this includes even those farmers who grow the grain or laborers who build the airplanes) that we as a nation might say that part of the denominator for the EROIext would be ten percent of all of the energy used in the country.



An important issue here is EROI vs. conversion efficiency. The EROI technically measures just the energy used in getting the rest of the energy to some point in society, usually the well-head. But if we then say “to the consumer” we have to include the refinery losses and energy costs, and also the costs to deliver the fuel to the final consumer. It may also include the energy costs of maintaining the infrastructure to use that fuel. These are in reality a bleeding off of the energy delivered, or a conversion efficiency of moving one barrel of oil into transportation services. So whether we should say “The minimum EROI is 3:1” or, somewhat more accurately, that to deliver one barrel of fuel to the final consumer and to use it requires about three barrels to be extracted from the ground, with two being used indirectly, is somewhat arbitrary, although the second way is technically more correct.

5.3. Extended EROI for Corn-based Ethanol

Given that our national goal is to deliver 36 billion gallons (2.9 EJ) of ethanol, then we can work backwards to calculate that something like 111 billion gallons of ethanol (or its equivalent of fossil fuels) would be required at the farm gate to generate and deliver the original 36 billion gallons of energy service to the end user with its attendant production, transportation and infrastructure costs. That number is the original 2.9 EJ delivered as fuel, plus 1.9 EJ for the infrastructure requirement (24/36 from oil x 2.9 EJ delivered), plus 0.24 EJ for the energy used in transportation (0.05 x (2.9 + 1.9)), plus 3.9 EJ for the energy to produce the required ethanol (0.76 x 5.1). Thus an additional 75 billion gallons (or 6.1 EJ) are required to deliver 36 billion gallons at the pump, so that an EROI of at least 3:1 is required for the fuel to not be subsidized by fossil fuels. EROIs above 3:1 are rarely reported for any liquid biofuels.






Thus by both economic (Figure 1) and energetic (i.e. assuming an EROImm of 10:1) measures calculated here it appears that at present roughly 10 percent of our economy is required to get the energy to run the other 90 percent, or 20 percent used to get 80 percent to the point of delivery, and even a larger percentage if the use infrastructure is included. This seems to be true if numerator and denominator are in either dollars or in energy. (Note: Our use of relatively cheap coal and hydroelectricity, both with a relatively high EROI, lifts the actual ratio “at the well-head” so that the EROImm for all energy delivered to society, but not the consumer, is roughly 20:1). By the time the oil energy is delivered to the consumer, 40 percent has been used and the EROIpou has fallen to roughly 6:1 (including the entire refining, conversion and delivery chain). But it is energy services that are desired, not energy itself, and to create these energy services requires energy investments in infrastructure that carry, at a minimum, large entropic losses. If infrastructure costs are included, the EROIext falls to about 3:1 because two-thirds of the energy has been used; implying that more energy is being spent on extraction, refining, delivering, and maintaining the transportation infrastructure than is found in the end product. Thus by the time a fuel with an EROImm of 10:1 is delivered to the consumer – that is after the energy costs of refinement and blending, transport, and infrastructure are included, the EROIext is 3:1. This means that twice as much oil is used to deliver the service than is used in the final-demand machine, and since most of our oil is used in transportation, including trucks and tractors, it is probably at present a reasonable number for the entire oil chain in our society.

6. Conclusions

Our educated guess is that the minimum EROImm for an oil-based fuel that will deliver a given service (i.e. miles driven, house heated) to the consumer will be something more than 3:1 when all of the additional energy required to deliver and use that fuel are properly accounted for. This ratio would increase substantially if the energy cost of supporting labor (generally considered a consumption by economists although definitely part of production here) or compensating for environmental destruction was included. While it is possible to imagine that one might use a great deal of fuel with an EROImm of 1.1 : 1 to pay for the use of one barrel by the consumption of many others, we believe it more appropriate to include the cost of using the fuel in the fuel itself. Thus we introduce the concept of “extended EROI” which includes not just the energy of getting the fuel, but also of transporting and using it. This process approximately triples the EROI required to use the fuel once obtained from the ground, since twice as much energy is consumed in the process of using the fuel than is in the fuel itself at its point of use. Any fuel with an EROImm less than the mean for society (about 10 to one) may in fact be subsidized by the general petroleum economy. For instance, fuels such as corn-based ethanol that have marginally positive EROIs (1.3: 1) will be subsidized by a factor of about two times more than the energy value of the fuel itself by the agricultural, transportation and infrastructure support undertaken by the main economy, which is two thirds based on oil and gas. These may be more important points than the exact math for the fuel itself, although all are important.

Of course the 3:1 minimum “extended EROI” that we calculate here is only a bare minimum for civilization. It would allow only for energy to run transportation or related systems, but would leave little discretionary surplus for all the things we value about civilization: art, medicine, education and so on; i.e. things that use energy but do not contribute directly to getting more energy or other resources. Whether we can say that such “discretionary energy” can come out of an EROImm of 3:1, or whether they require some kind of large surplus from that energy directed to more fundamental things such as transport and agriculture was something we thought we could answer in this paper but which has remained elusive for us thus far.

7. Acknowledgements

We would like to thank John Cooksey from www.howtoboilafrog.com and 4 unknown reviewers for many helpful comments.

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Alcoa Eyes Solar Industry

Friday, March 26th, 2010

The New York Times has an article on Alcoa's interest in making reflective solar troughs for the solar thermal power industry (Aluminium Maker Eyes Solar Industry), leveraging their experience in aircraft wing box design and replacing the reflective glass in parabolic troughs with aluminium.

Alcoa claim their all-aluminum parabolic trough (currently being tested at the National Renewable Energy Laboratory in Colorado) will cut the price of a solar field "by 20 percent due to lower installation costs".

Parabolic troughs focus sunlight on liquid-filled receivers suspended over the mirrors to create steam that drives an electricity-generating turbine. Parabolic trough technology has been in modern use in solar power plants since the early 1980s, but Alcoa executives said they saw an opportunity to refine the technology and get a foothold in the rapidly expanding renewable energy market.

“If you go out and look behind large parabolic troughs, you’ll find an elaborate truss structure,” said Rick Winter, a technology executive with Alcoa. “From our understanding of aerospace structures, we said if we can modify the wing box design used in aircraft and integrate a parabolic reflector, it would give us a light and stiff structure that would fundamentally affect the cost equation.” ...

Aluminum manufacturing, however, is the nation’s most energy-intensive industry, according to the Energy Department. Mr. Kerns said Alcoa had not performed a life-cycle analysis of the total energy costs and benefits of deploying such parabolic troughs, but noted that the company planned to use recycled materials to make the solar collectors. “We can take the energy intensity out, as much of the structural elements have the potential to use recycled aluminum,” Mr. Kerns said. ...

The Alcoa executives said the company planned to have its solar trough in commercial production within two to three years.

Alcoa Australia's WA alumina refinery expansion remains stalled because of an inability to obtain cheap long term gas supplies as a result of LNG exports limiting supply into the local market (the Varanus Island incident a couple of years hasn't helped matters either). However Alcoa has managed to obtain long term supply contracts for its refinery in Victoria - but using brown coal fired power - the dirtiest power source of all.

If we consider these 3 news items together it would seem that perhaps they should have looked harder at some form of solar thermal power (perhaps combined with gas or geothermal energy) for their Australian operations, using technology they have developed themselves...

Cross posted from Peak Energy.